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Introduction
Long before the so-called ‘European migration crisis’ of 2015, which gave rise to a
vibrant political debate on the responsibility and reception conditions for asylum
seekers, scholars had been noting that states consistently violate the human rights of
asylum seekers as a result of the destination countries’ politics, policies and practice
(e.g. [20, 23, 24, 30, 38]). Asylum seeking has been transformed from a human rights
issue into a security problem and asylum seekers have come to be understood as a
group of people whom Bwe^ need to be protected from, rather than as people in need of
protection [1, 2]. The identification of failures to positively embrace the right to asylum
throughout Europe [24] may be particularly disturbing to the institutional legitimacy of
a country such as Sweden as a result of a desire to maintain the country’s self-image of
decency and humanity (see [29, 46]). The treatment of asylum-seekers and others
applying for residence permits in Sweden is part of a general trend in Europe, where
border controls have intensified, immigration has become criminalized [7, 10] and
where many applicants have to experience the considerable force of what has been
referred to as the European deportation machine [20].
These developments have been met with some criticism, however, from a number
bodies of control, whose focus is directed at holding the state or its agencies to account
by means of publishing criticism or recommendations focused on the Swedish state’s
treatment of current and former residence permit applicants, who are for the most part
asylum seekers. At the national level, the task of scrutinizing the Swedish state is
assigned to among others the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice.
At the international level, scrutiny is exercised by e.g. the European Court of Human
Rights and committees of the UN. Domestic and international Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) may also be viewed as scrutinisers of the actions of the state.
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Although all of these different types of institution do exercise control over the state, a
reasonable point of departure is that the ways in which control of the state is exercised
vary across different types of control mechanism. The assumption is here that various
control bodies present problematic actions by the state in diverse ways, and the problem
representations will be embedded in different frames, defined as Bunderlying structures
of belief, perception, and appreciation^ [48, p. 23]. The struggle over the naming and
framing of a situation includes not only the way problems are represented but also the
solution [48]. Bacchi’s [4] BWhat’s the problem represented to be^ approach, which
was developed for the identification and assessment of problem representations in
policy proposals, provides a tool that can be used to reveal how bodies criticising the
state name and frame the problem of the state’s handling of migration.
The aim of this study is to develop an understanding of how the field of control of
the Swedish state works in practice by highlighting the conditions that allow particular
problem representations to be formed within different types of bodies that exercise
control in relation to the state. Thus, the article aims to answer the following questions:
How do mechanisms of control represent the problem of the state’s handling of the
process of seeking asylum and residence permits in Sweden? How are these frames
related to the positions and strategies of the different bodies of control?
In order to achieve this aim, I analyse criticism and judgments relating to the state on
the basis of a sample of judgements and reports in which such criticism is expressed
and also using data from interviews conducted with organs that exercise formal and
informal control in relation to the state. Thus multiple sources of data are employed as a
means of strengthening the study’s analysis (see [28]) of how problems are represented
by various bodies of control and of the frames in which these problems are embedded.
The research questions are tied together by an understanding that views control of the
state as a field, inspired by Bourdieu’s understanding of a field as an ongoing struggle
between social agents [12]. The struggle within this field can be described as a game in
which the social actors compete for recognition and legitimacy. This paper focuses on how
the bodies of control struggle for recognition and legitimacywithin the field. The concept of
legitimacy refers here to recognition and acceptance [12] and is understood in terms of an
ongoing discussion rather than as a fixed phenomenon or an all-or-nothing matter [33, 49].
The frames used by the bodies that exercise control in relation to the state reflect these
bodies’ struggle for recognition and legitimacy within the field. This paper contributes to
furthering our understanding of how the framing strategies adopted by control bodies reflect
their positionality within the field and of how legitimacy within the field is negotiated, and
the relevance of the findings therefore extends beyond the Swedish case. The paper’s
findings may also be generalized beyond control of the state and the field of asylum
seeking, since they link into scholarship on how NGOs and social movements negotiate
the balance between making radical criticism or moderate claims and on the ways in which
this shapes how issues are framed and how these organisations positions themselves in their
respective fields (see [17, 18, 26, 32]).
Formal and informal bodies of control
The control mechanisms selected for this study can be categorized in different ways
according to their function and purpose: formal/informal and internal/external (to a
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government or a country) [40, 42]. The external controls lie outside of the state
apparatus of the state in question and the control that they exercise is imposed on the
state [43]. Internal controls have been criticized because they tend to protect the
interests of the government rather than those of the individual [41]. Bearing these
concepts of formal/informal and internal/external control in mind, the control bodies
selected for this study can be described and categorized as follows. The Parliamentary
Ombudsman has the task of scrutinizing how Swedish laws are applied in the context
of public sector activity. It is formal, external to government and operates as a domestic
control organ. The Chancellor of Justice acts as the government’s ombudsman in
relation to the supervision of agencies and state officials, and is an organ of formal,
internal and domestic control.1 The European Court examines allegations of violations
of the rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights, and can be
described as formal, external and international. The different UN committees monitor
the compliance of UN member states with conventions such as the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and can be
categorized as organs of formal control that are external to government and interna-
tional. The NGOs are external to governments, may be both domestic and international
and the control they exercise is informal. On the other hand, several NGOs have a
formal advisory role at the UN and the Council of Europe, and in connection with
inquiries by UN organs or committees, NGOs are invited to write what are often
referred to as Alternative or Shadow reports, which usually identify other types of
human rights problems in the countries concerned than those described in the official
reports from the countries’ governments. However, the NGOs working with migrant
issues are far from homogenous, and vary from well-established international NGOs
with links to the UN, to local NGOs with less influence on the international agenda but
with a wide range of functions.
One of the issues debated in the field of the control of the state is that of how the
object of the control should be labelled. Several concepts are used such as abuses of
power, wrongdoing, unlawful actions, violations, irregularities, harm and crime. In
many contexts, and particularly those linked to human rights, the breaches of laws or
conventions involved are not described as crimes. This discussion goes back to
arguments on how to define crimes by the state. Scholars have referred to international
law and conventions on human rights (see for example [15, 25]) as well as to national
legislation and regulatory violations, according to which state actions can be classified
as crimes (see for example [16, 44]). Inspired by Rothe [44], state crime is defined here
as either acts or instances of inaction, which are attributable to an agent of the state and
which violate domestic law (including administrative law) or international law (includ-
ing human rights violations). It includes, but is not limited to, acts committed by the
state and acts for which state agencies are reprimanded, or deemed liable to pay
compensation, by the mechanisms controlling the state. In this sense the wrongs,
violations, and unlawful actions that are subject to the control of the Parliamentary
Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, UN
1 None of the formal domestic controls are able to rescind the decisions of state agencies, and the available
sanctions instead involve issuing reprimands/criticism. However, The Chancellor of Justice can order the
payment of compensation for damages. The Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice also
have the authority to prosecute individuals and to recommend disciplinary measures – although this only
happens a few times per year.
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committees and NGOs could be labelled as crimes, even though they comprise a wide
range of wrongs and harms including less serious violations.
Theoretical approach
According to Bourdieu [12, p. 133] a field is Ban area, a playing field, a field of
objective relations among individuals or institutions competing for the same stakes^.
The field is defined by its specific stakes and interests. This means that to study a field
we need to uncover the struggle that constitutes the field [12]. What is it that is worth
fighting for? According to Moi [35, p. 1021], the aim of the struggle in a given field is:
Bto rule the field, to become the instance which has the power to confer or withdraw
legitimacy from other participants in the game^. The struggle within the field at issue in
the current article can be described as a game in which the social actors, the state, the
control bodies and the migrants or those representing the migrants, compete for
recognition and legitimacy. The focus of this paper is directed at the bodies of control
themselves, and less at the struggles engaged in by representatives of the state or by
those who hold the state to account via these bodies of control. In the case at point here,
it would be rather insensitive to consider the various actors as competing for the same
stakes – since the migrants’ struggle for recognition and legitimacy may well also be a
struggle for survival. The struggle is related to the social agent’s various forms of
capital. To gain recognition and legitimacy, agents use various strategies in relation to
their position in the field. To Bourdieu [13], the unequal distribution of various kinds of
capital constitutes the very structure of a given field. The application of Bourdieu’s
notion of a field is primarily intended to assist in developing the analysis of the relations
within the field of control of the state, the positions of the relevant social agents and the
strategies employed.
Within the field, the institutional environment creates a habitus, a Bsense of the
game^ [13, p. 11], which can be understood as an acceptable and Bnatural^ way of
thinking and acting within the specific context [8, 54]. Connected to habitus is the
term doxa, which for Bourdieu stands for the schemes of thought and perception
of the social world that appear to be natural and self-evident [11]. Whyte [54]
describes the example of the liberal understanding of the free market society as a
doxic experience that goes unquestioned. Even though doxa is understood as
established and beyond discussion, Bourdieu reminds us that it has not always
been so and that doxa is historically situated [13]. That means that doxa also can
be challenged, but a crisis is a necessary condition for an anti-doxic critique to
develop [11, 35].
In addition, Mathiesen’s book the Politics of Abolition [34], in which he carefully
considers various political strategies focused on obtaining the goal of the abolition of
prisons, has been found to provide valuable insights that help to further develop the
analysis of the positions and strategies of the bodies controlling the state. Mathiesen
differentiates between strategies of Bmoving into the established systems^ and strategies
that involve Bremaining outside the established system^ [34, p. 21]. Taking the
Norwegian prison association KROM as an example, he discusses the revolutionists
and the reformists within the organization, arguing that the former risk being B‘defined
out’ as irrelevant^, while the latter risk being B‘defined in’ as undangerous^ [34, p. 23].
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In Mathiesen’s view, the solution is to avoid being either defined in or defined out and
instead to remain unfinished. The unfinished alternative should be based on premises
that contradict and compete with the prevailing order. He singles out positive reforms
aimed at improving the system - making it function more effectively – and negative
reforms that negate the basic prison structure. Since positive reform legitimizes the
prevailing order, he argues that in order to enable long-term goals the reforms should be
of the negative kind [34]. Related to different positions in the field, Haines [26]
develops an understanding of relations between organisations with moderate and with
more radical claims. When moderate claims by social movements are contested by
more radical claims, the moderate demands can be redefined and treated as more
reasonable. Thus moderates can gain more support and attract more resources, as well
as receiving access to decision makers as a result of their relative acceptability.
These aspects have some importance in relation to how the control of the state
works, its efficacy and the strategies used by various forms of bodies of control, not
least with regard to NGOs as bodies of informal control in relation to the state.
Data and methods
Using Bacchi’s what’s the problem approach as a methodological tool, the paper
examines how various bodies controlling the state represent the problem and the frames
in which these problems are embedded. 2 The approach is grounded in discourse
analysis, where a discourse is defined as Bthe language, concepts and categories
employed to frame an issue^ [4, p. 2].3 It is a comparative case study that includes
five main types of control mechanisms. These data sources are judgements issued by
the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice, the European Court of
Human Rights and UN committees as well as reports from UN committees and NGOs.
In addition, interviews have been conducted with representatives of some of the control
bodies, namely the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice, and the
European Court, and also several NGOs.
Judgements from the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice and the
European Court of Human rights relating to the process of seeking asylum and other
types of residence permit were selected from a larger sample of (over 8000) judgments,
which related to all types of complaints against the state apparatus between the years
2000 and 2010, in which the three control bodies described above had either issued a
reprimand or had resolved the complaint by ordering the Swedish state to pay com-
pensation for damages caused. Of the 114 judgments that were included in the analysis,
the majority had been issued by the Parliamentary Ombudsman (100) and fewer by the
2 In the field of media studies, frames have been treated as a deliberate process, a selection or a fabrication
[31]. The process in which problems are represented by NGOs may, for example, be viewed as being more
strategic and intentional in relation to attempts to attract attention to their concerns [28] than is the case with
regard to formal control bodies such as the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the European Court, where the
process is more unintentional or at least more tightly bound to certain criteria. However, the question of
strategy or intentionality is not the main concern here, but rather how problems are represented and the
implications of these representations (see [4], p. 36).
3 At the same time as I find Bacchi’s approach useful and Bhands on^ for analysing how problems are
presented, I do not follow every step of her approach, which includes, for example, Foucauldian archaeology
and geneology analysis [5].
The state’s mishandling of immigration to Sweden
Chancellor of Justice (11) and the European Court of Human Rights (3). The judgments
primarily relate to the Migration Board, but also to agencies such as the police, the
courts, the municipalities and embassies, as well as to the Government itself, which is
the body whose actions are reviewed by the European Court.
In order to identify relevant UN documents for inclusion in the analysis, a search
was done through Reports of Special Rapporteurs, Periodic Reviews4 and Individual
Communications 5 from any UN committees (treaty monitoring bodies) related to
Sweden between 2000 and 2010 that included the term refugee, asylum seeker or
migrant. All these were read in order to identify those documents that presented
substantive concerns or recommendations related to the process of seeking asylum or
other types of residence permit in Sweden. In total, 31 documents from the UN were
selected; a figure that includes 7 reports from Special Rapporteurs, 15 Periodic Reviews
and 8 Individual Communications. In addition, as a result of reading the Periodic
Reviews 14 Alternative Reports from NGOs was identified.
In addition, nine semi-structured interviews, lasting between 1 and 2 h, were
conducted with representatives of formal and informal control bodies. The interviews
conducted with representatives from formal domestic and international control bodies
(the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice and the European Court)
contributed by providing descriptions of experiences and knowledge of how this type
of control is performed, and of its strengths and limitations. Interviews were also
conducted with representatives from six NGOs that work either with human rights in
general or more specifically with the rights of migrants, as asylum-seekers and as
undocumented individuals residing in Sweden. Some of the NGOs have been involved
in the process of writing shadow reports, some have not. In this sense, they represent
both organisations that are well-established within international monitoring bodies and
organisations that are not. The interviews revolved around their work, how they
assessed the situation for asylum seekers or other migrants in Sweden, experiences of
criticism directed at state actors, and experiences of other control bodies focused on the
control of states.6 To protect the interview participants’ confidentiality, the names of the
NGOs will not be presented, since some of these NGOs only have one or a small
number of employees working with these issues.
The analysis was completed in three main steps, by (1) identifying the problem
representations and linking the problems to underlying frames (2) highlighting the
conditions that allow a particular problem representation to take shape (3) identifying
how the frames are related to the strategies and positions of the various bodies of
control within the field. In the second step, a more sophisticated understanding was
4 In all cases but one I only include the Concluding Observations, which constitute the outcome of the review
and which include positive aspects as well as concerns and recommendations. When it comes to the Universal
Periodic Report, I selected both the final report and a compilation of UN information about Sweden which
included a summary of human rights concerns that I found interesting. The latter also included a background
document in the form of a Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
which was also found to be relevant for inclusion.
5 Individual Communications reflect the ability of individuals to complain about violations of their rights to
human rights treaty bodies (Committees). Only those cases where a violation had been identified were
included.
6 Two of the interviews with NGOs were conducted a couple of years earlier than the other seven interviews,
which means that somewhat different questions were asked, although the focus of all the questions was on the
same field.
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develop of the similarities and differences in the frames adopted by different control
bodies, as well as of their limitations and benefits, in order to be able to highlight the
conditions that allow particular problem representations to be constituted within dif-
ferent types of bodies controlling the state. In the third step, Bourdieu’s notion of a field
is applied to assist in developing the analysis of the relations within the field of control
of the state, the positions of the bodies of control and the strategies employed. In the
context of the second and third step of the analysis, the experiences described in the
interviews with representatives of the various control bodies played an important role.
How problems are framed
The analysis of problem representations draws attention to how various bodies control-
ling the Swedish state differ in their framing of an issue. The following section of this
paper, were the results are presented, is organised on the basis of the different types of
control body (formal domestic, formal international and informal). The presentation
describes the problem representations identified and the frames in which these problems
are embedded for each type of control body respectively. Thereafter, Bourdieu’s notion
of a field and Mathiesen’s [34] conceptualization of strategies for political action are
applied primarily to assist in developing the analysis of the relations between the
framings and the positions of the different bodies of control and the strategies employed.
Taken together, the identified problem representations have been interpreted in the
context of six different frames, which I have labelled procedural issues, the rule of law,
non-refoulement, positive obligations and non-discrimination, repressive elements and
the right to asylum. The first frame, procedural issues, includes problem representa-
tions related to the process of seeking asylum and residence permits and to state
agencies’ failures to conduct their bureaucratic tasks properly. The second frame, the
rule of law, is also a form of procedural frame but differs from the previous frame since
it consists of problem representations that depict the process of seeking asylum as
unfair and unequal. The third frame non-refoulement, concerns the protection of
refugees from being returned or expelled to places where their lives or freedoms could
be threatened and involves problems represented as being due to Swedish authorities’
making incorrect decisions in relation to asylum applications. The fourth frame,
positive obligations and non-discrimination, includes problem representations related
to the Swedish state’s failure to provide equal access to society’s welfare systems. The
fifth frame, repressive elements, includes problems associated with the state being
described as too repressive in cases of detention and deportation. The problem repre-
sentations related to these first five frames have all been identified in the material from
the written reports and judgements. The sixth frame, the right to asylum, emerged in the
material from the interviews with some of the NGOs and comprises challenges to the
current system of asylum seeking and border controls (Table 1).
Formal domestic controls
The problems represented by the formal domestic control bodies (the Parliamentary
Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice) have been interpreted within a frame of
procedural issues. The problems highlighted by these bodies relate to the state’s failure
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to conduct its procedural tasks properly. This includes a lot of different issues: not
having taken all the relevant information into account in the application process, long
application-processing times, delays in appointing a legal counsel, delays in the
provision of information to the applicant or the legal counsel and the loss of original
documents belonging to the applicant, such as passports and marriage certificates, and
also the treatment given asylum seekers and persons applying for residence permits.
None of the adjudications focus on the actual decision relating to the issuance of a
residence permit or the awarding of refugee status. In addition to the failures associated
with administrative tasks, there is also criticism related to the enforcement of deporta-
tions, with a particularly focus on the work of the police. However, even if the report
includes accusations of brutality or of wrongful decisions relating to a deportation, the
adjudications from the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice only
focus on the documentation of the incident, not on the enforcement of the deportation
itself.
The naming and framing of the acts of the state may be harsh, but the proposed
solutions give the impression that the problems are viewed as shortcomings rather than
as systemic failures. An exception from this framing is the case concerning the
deportation, in December 2001, of two men to Egypt from Sweden by US agents with
the assistance of the Swedish Security Service. The Parliamentary Ombudsman strong-
ly condemned the Swedish Security Service for a number of organizational failures,
describing some of its acts as unlawful [36]. Labelling acts as unlawful is very rare,
particularly when it comes to the formal domestic control bodies. In this sense, referring
to acts in this way constitutes a strong condemnation by comparison with the use of the
word violation, which is not considered to carry the same weight (see [53]). However,
the Swedish state officials are mainly blamed for their passivity in relation to the
treatment of the two men; a case of omission rather than commission (see [6]). The
decision on the deportation itself, which was taken by the government, was not
investigated, since the government and its ministers are not subject to the oversight
of the Parliamentary Ombudsman. While the Parliamentary Ombudsman seems to
consider this in terms of an isolated incident, other control bodies view the case as a
continuum of incorrect actions and of omissions to compensate for these failures.
Framing the problem as a procedural issue may allow for an understanding of the
state as generally well-functioning, but at the same time also subject to occasional
failures. Even when the problem is represented as endemic, the underlying assumption
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seems to be that the problem can be resolved by means of improved routines. The
binary between satisfactory/unsatisfactory asylum processes shapes a perception of the
asylum process and of the rules this process is based on as being valid. This means that
the question of whether the decisions on asylum and residence permits, or the substan-
tive treatment of the applicants, have been correct on the basis of national or interna-
tional obligations is not open to examination. The procedural issue frame is shaped by
the fact that the two domestic control bodies do not generally comment on the
assessments made by state authorities.
In addition, another condition that allows this problem representation to take shape
is found in the social statuses of the agents who report the incidents (even though both
of these domestic control bodies can initiate cases themselves). With the exception of
the cases involving the enforcement of deportations, the incidents referred to have
occurred within the process of seeking a residence permit. Those outside this process,
i.e. the undocumented individuals, and their perceived problems, are not included
within this frame. The important factor here is not citizenship, however (cf. [21]), but
rather the formal status of being a residence-permit applicant. This is a status that in
Bourdieu’s terminology may be described as the capital that is essential for having a
position in the field where the state is held accountable.
Formal international control
The formal international control bodies, the European Court and the UN, present
problems within four type of frames, non-refoulement, the rule of law, positive obliga-
tions and non-discrimination and repressive elements. Overall, the problems are framed
in line with a distinction between control as addressing individual complaints (judge-
ments from European Court or the UN) or general human rights problems (in the UN
reports). In the UN discourse, calls for solutions are more prominent than the criticism
expressed, and this criticism is formulated as recommendations rather than as a
condemnation.
The problem representations formulated by the European Court of Human Rights
are interpreted within a frame of non-refoulement. The judgments from the European
Court conclude that the implementation of a deportation order against the applicant
would give rise to a violation of the rights to life or a violation of the prohibition of
torture. The judgments convey a distrust of the way in which the state has interpreted
the grounds for protection adduced by the asylum seekers. However, the statements
and the language used in the judgments, imply that no damage has yet been done.
The judgements establish a binary between those who are in need of protection and
those who are not, and highlight the underlying assumption that the sovereign state
can allow certain individuals to become members of the nation state, and deny this to
others. Sovereignty gives the state the privilege to deny non-citizens residency and to
enforce their departure (see [19]). The context contributes to an image of the
Swedish state as a (failed) protector of human rights, rather than as a violator of
human rights (see [39]). A supranational legal framing allow NGOs to contest states
at the national level. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Bondaroff [18] demonstrate the
possibility of using legal framings that express an affirmation of supranational
principles, and which enable NGOs to enjoy more universal support and at the same
time challenge state actions in a radical way. However, the problem representations
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formulated by the formal international control organs are understood in relation to
the framework of human rights, a framework that is supported by states, and not
least by the Swedish state. In this sense, holding states accountable for violations of
human rights may not only strengthen the legitimacy of the human rights framework
but may also contribute to the legitimacy of states themselves [37, 50]. In other
words, turning to law may serve a stabilizing and conservative function in relation to
the existing the political order, to use Arendt’s [3] terminology.
The same frame, non-refoulement, is apparent in the problem representations for-
mulated by the UN. Unlike the material from the European Court, the focus in UN
periodical reports and in reports from Special Rapporteurs is not exclusively directed at
individual cases.
Problem representations concerning the application process of the UN have been
interpreted within a rule of law frame, which contrasts with the way problems are
represented in the procedural issue frame. In the procedural issue frame, problems are
represented as occurring within the context of a process that is largely fair, whereas in
the rule of law frame, the process of seeking asylum is represented as unfair and
unequal. In the reports from the UN, attention is directed at the decision-making
process, including rejections of asylum-claims and deportations executed on inaccurate
grounds, the withholding of information at deportation hearings, particularly hearings
involving suspected terrorists, aspects of the decisions made in relation to LGBT-
persons and women in general, and also a general distrust of asylum-seekers, as
indicated by credibility assessments. The problem representations are embedded in an
underlying assumption that the proceedings of the Swedish agency in question are
flawed with regard to the principal of legal certainty. However, these aspects are
developed further by the NGOs. The rule of law frame, as well as the following frames
by the UN commissions, is shaped by an external assessment of the state, rather than of
state agencies, and it focuses on general issues – noting systemic problems.
Embedded in a frame of positive obligations and non-discrimination, problems are
represented in several UN reports as involving insufficient efforts to prevent various
forms of discrimination: the discrimination of asylum seekers in general, discrimination
in relation to gender issues and insufficient efforts to combat violence against refugee
women in particular, the discrimination of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers
in relation to access to health care, education and housing. The reports also note
problems linked to the reception of unaccompanied children in general and to ineffec-
tive measures to prevent the disappearance of children travelling without guardians in
particular. This frame is shaped by an external assessment of the state, framing the state
as continuously violating human rights.
Problem representations concerning the detention of immigrants, which are found in
the UN documents, have been interpreted within a frame of repressive elements. This
frame also applies to the presentations in a number of UN reports of the case discussed
above involving the deportation of two men to Egypt in 2001. In contrast to the other
frames described, this frame highlights acts of commission by state representatives. The
problem of detention is presented as a question of the extent to which (how often and
for how long) detention is employed. The problem of asylum seekers being placed in
remand prisons without having committed a crime, on the other hand, is presented as a
practice that needs to be abandoned. These interpretations of the problem representa-
tions relating to the detention of asylum seekers have implications for the issue of the
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legitimacy of the state. If the state detains people without cause, the legitimacy of the
state is in question, but if it is instead presented as an issue of the extent to which
detention is employed, this need not be interpreted as a challenge to the legitimacy of
the state. This issue will be discussed further in relation to the framings employed by
the NGOs.
Informal control
The analysis of the informal control conducted by NGOs reveals similar frames as
those found in relation to the formal international control bodies, first and foremost the
UN. The similarities between the problem representations of the UN and the NGOs is
not surprising, since the NGO reports constitute a basis for the UN periodic reports,
while the UN reports are used by NGOs to emphasise their problem representations.
There are two central differences however. First, the problems are represented some-
what differently within the same frames and the language used within these frames
differs. Second, a new frame emerged in the interviews with the NGOs, which I have
labelled the right to asylum.
The criticism discourse found in the reports of NGOs resembles that of the UN.
However, the criticism is more outspoken and harsh than that of the UN, for example
stating that not providing adequate representation to a person seeking asylum is Ba
breach of the right to equal treatment before the law^ [52]. By comparison with the
other control bodies, the criticism of the NGOs is more often formulated in general
terms, suggesting a systemic problem, as in the example: BThere appears to be a general
reluctance to believe in the statements of asylum seekers^ [45].
The issue of decisions to reject applications for residence permits has been
interpreted within two different frames, depending on how the problem is represented.
As described in the frame labelled non-refoulement, the issue is presented as a wrongful
decision, while in the UN and NGO reports it is also represented as an issue of the
grounds for the application having been unfairly examined, and is thus interpreted as
falling under the rule of law frame. The difference may seem subtle, but I would
suggest that it has some significance for our understanding of the way control is
exercised in relation to states. Consider the following quote from an NGO in an
Alternative Report:
[…] there is a lack of knowledge and /or experience among counsels in asylum
law, but there is also a lack of understanding in human rights law and human-
itarian law at the Migration Board and even in the courts. Judgments are not well
reasoned enough to serve as legal guidance for a legally predictable outcome.
[51]
The problem is presented here as both general and an issue of insufficient knowl-
edge, creating a situation with poor legal security for the asylum seeker. In this sense, it
is not a question of (a number of) incorrect decisions but rather of a system that is
failing to live up to principle of the rule of law. The problem representations that are
located within this frame by the NGOs lean more towards describing Sweden as a
systemic violator of her responsibility to provide protection from other states than they
do towards describing Sweden as failing to provide protection in individual cases.
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The difference between the formal and informal control bodies is also noticeable in
the repressive elements frame, but this frame also reveals difference among the group of
NGOs. While a number of NGOs consider the use of detention centres to be problem-
atic in certain respects, one of the NGO representatives expressed a powerful condem-
nation of the detention centres and argued for their use to be completely abandoned
since detaining someone who has not committed a crime should instead be regarded as
a serious crime by the state. In contrast to the problem formulation described by the UN
and also in the written reports from NGOs, in this particular interview the legality of the
detention centres per se was called into question. The interviewee reflected on this
position, and described it as radical in the context of the contemporary political climate,
and explained this as possibly due to the NGO’s independence in relation to the
political powers that be. This frame, and the significant differences found within it
illustrates the way in which frames are embedded in a socio-cultural context [9], but it
also highlights the different positions of bodies of control and the strategies employed
in the field. These aspects will be further discussed below.
Furthermore, in the interviews, the NGOs emphasised the lack of legal paths for
migration and how border controls constitute (illegitimate) barriers to people’s efforts to
seek protection; these are problems that are not mentioned in any of the written reports
or judgments. Although these problems are represented somewhat differently by
different NGOs, depending on the respective organization’s view of borders and state
sovereignty, they are nonetheless embedded in the same frame - the right to asylum.
The emphasis within this frame differs somewhat between NGOs, with some framing
the issues in terms of the right to seek asylum while others frame them more in terms of
the right to be given asylum. Thus, the informality of the control exercised by NGOs,
the more distant position occupied by NGOs within the field of control of states, and
also the ability to grasp issues on the basis of a structural perspective, may be the
central conditions that shape this frame. The positions occupied by the NGOs are
important to an understanding of their ability to (at least to some extent) challenge
doxa. The positions and strategies employed by the bodies of control will be discussed
below.
The positions and strategies of the bodies of control
The Bourdieu-inspired understanding of control of the state as a field produces a focus
on the ongoing struggling between social agents. Strategies are developed to maintain
or improve the social agents’ positions in the field [14]. The struggle for recognition
and legitimacy is demonstrated, among other things, by means of the framing of
problems. In this article the focus is directed at the bodies of control, and at how they
frame problems related to their positions and strategies within the field. However, the
NGOs represent a double role in this game. First and foremost they act as bodies of
informal control by publishing reports and disclosing crimes by states, but they are also
in a sense complainants, in that they make use of formal bodies of control to hold the
state accountable. In both these roles, however, it seems to be crucial to be accepted as
credible and to receive recognition. In addition, the analysis of the positions and
strategies found within the field employs Mathiesen’s [34] conceptualization of strat-
egies for political action.
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Struggling for recognition and balancing between defined in and defined out
With regard to how the organs of formal domestic control formulate their judgments,
these were described by a representative of one NGO as Bhaving no bite^. This
description is similar to the picture painted by another NGO representative, who
underlines the effects, or lack thereof, of the formal domestic control: BThen I think
that the longer you work with this, you get to feel a bit tired about the fact that it’s a
fairly blunt instrument. What did it lead to? Does reporting things to the Parliamentary
Ombudsman change anything?^ (Interview, NGO). Similarly, several of the NGO
representatives expressed disappointment at the praxis of the European Court. One
representative of an NGO described how the Court is not known among human rights
lawyers for Btaking a lead in any way whatsoever^ (Interview, NGO).
The perceived ineffectiveness of these formal controls may perhaps be explained by
viewing this form of control as a field in which the control mechanisms are striving for
recognition and legitimacy (see [35]) and have to navigate between what Mathiesen
[34] describes as being defined in or defined out. Representatives of the formal
domestic control bodies describe having to balance their criticism. The following quote
is an example of how this consideration is expressed:
BI can’t be an activist, because then I think you’d quickly lose credibility. So you
have to find a balance. I can see the role of the Parliamentary Ombudsman;
expressing criticism is actually not all that interesting, what’s important is finding
alternatives, finding a potential for improvement.^ (Interview, Parliamentary
Ombudsman)
In addition, the recognition achieved by the formal domestic control mechanisms is
viewed as being of special importance, since their decisions are not legally binding on
state authorities. In other words, the control mechanisms need their recognition and
legitimacy in order to control the state. In relation to their position, one understandable
strategy might be that suggested by the representative of the Parliamentary Ombuds-
man in the above quote; instead of focusing on criticism, they try to find a potential for
improvement in the state agency concerned. However, this strategy could be interpreted
as exemplifying what Mathiesen [34] describes as positive reform, which legitimizes
the prevailing order by improving the system so that it functions more efficiently.
Similarly, the representative of the European Court underlined how every decision is
a balancing act that is of importance for the legitimacy for the Court. This legitimacy is
associated with the Bpossibility of [the Court’s] decisions being accepted. Over the
years, the Court has been criticised for being both too activist and too laid back. As
long as there is criticism in both directions, I think it’s ok.^ (Interview, European
Court). If these formal bodies of control were to become too progressive or activist-like,
they would risk losing credibility and also what Mathiesen [34] would call being
defined out as irrelevant. Thus, the way the problems are framed by the formal domestic
controls and the European Court can be understood in relation to this struggle and
balancing act.
In the same way, the NGOs’ position in the field is also related to how they frame
problems. Representatives of NGOs describe the formulation of their criticism as based
on issues of strategy and on considerations necessary to maintain their credibility. This
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is the case for all control bodies, but the organs of informal control are particularly
dependent on the authorities’ willingness to introduce change, either in the individual
case or in relation to the structural issues. One of the few available weapons is that of
Bnaming and shaming^ [27]. One of the NGO representatives emphasised that an NGO
can express strong condemnation of state authorities as long as it maintains a strict and
correct attitude and avoids being Btoo political^. With this last phrase, the interviewee is
referring to terms that have been used by other organisations, such us Bmass
deportations^ risk producing negative attitudes among decision makers that would in
turn reduce the opportunities for the NGOs to reach out with their message. The risk of
being defined out is also described as an issue when it comes to collaborating with
NGOs that have more radical demands. In this regard, Moi [35] notes that without an
understanding of the habitus in a given field, and of the unspoken rules governing what
can legitimately be said or perceived within the field, certain discourses risk being
excluded as nonsense. As was noted in Haines [26] study, being defined out may also
be associated with one’s relative position and acceptability in the field, where the
recognition and legitimacy of those framing moderate criticisms may be strengthened
by the presence of more radical criticism.
As regards the NGOs’ role as a mechanism controlling the state, several of the
representatives talked, directly or indirectly, about the influence of their organisations
and about how this was linked to their strategies. I find this important for understanding
the critical discourse formulated by the NGOs and for the frames in which their
problem representations are embedded. I have interpreted some of these methods and
approaches as a means of formalising the informal control exercised by NGOs. Some of
the NGOs had a significant role in the control of the state, since they were given a
formal role in UN processes via the writing of shadow reports, while other interviewed
NGOs described having regular meetings with state agencies and other decision
makers. A couple of the interviewees describe this direct relationship with decision
makers as providing a great opportunity for making an impact. Other NGOs viewed the
formalised relations to the state as associated with certain risks, which I have
interpreted in Mathiesen [34] terms as involving being defined in as undangerous.
The negative consequence of formalising their relationship with state agencies is
described by representatives of NGOs in terms of a risk of becoming an alibi for the
state. Young [55] describes similar experiences from NGOs of being co-opted and
dampened when engaging with powerful organisations and decision making bodies.
Here, by formalizing their contacts with state agencies, the NGOs hope to gain access
and influence but at the same time risk giving legitimacy to the agencies they wish to
call in to question. This is what [22] has labelled the price of power, with
organisations maintaining their position within the field by not challenging the social
order.
Challenging doxa
The problem representations by NGOs, and the frames they are embedded in, reveal the
specific position of NGOs as controls of the state. Within other control bodies,
particularly the formal domestic controls and the European Court, but to some extent
even the UN, the focus is on particular problems with the asylum seeking process, and
the process of seeking asylum is taken for granted. In Bourdieu’s terms, the system of
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sovereign nation states protecting their borders and only granting certain outside
applicants access to the state is self-evident and Bgoes without saying^ [11, p. 167].
A few of the NGOs question this doxa and ask what is so normal about borders, why is
a restrictive immigration policy taken for granted, and how can we have ratified human
rights conventions about the right to seek asylum when it is impossible to legally arrive
in the country where you want to seek protection. These types of issues are what Bacchi
[5] would have referred to as factors that the other control bodies have failed to
problematize. Challenging the doxa of the field may, as was observed by NGO
representatives, compromise the organisation’s influence and credibility.
I have suggested elsewhere [47] that as long as control organs are not engaged in
producing a systematic overview of crimes committed by the state, focusing instead on
particular issues relating to specific individuals, their work may serve to strengthen the
legitimacy of the state. On the other hand, this study has noted that the position
occupied by a control organ in the field in relation to the state may be highly relevant
for understanding the control organs potential for challenging the legitimacy of the
state. Framing anti-doxic criticism (see [35]) may place the trustworthiness and legit-
imacy of the control organ in question at risk. However, for those NGOs who are less
bounded by the field, and already have less influence, the risk of being defined out may
be less harmful.
Concluding discussion
Initially, I asked how various bodies of control represent the problem of the state’s
handling of the process of seeking asylum and residence permits in Sweden and how
these frames are related to the positions and strategies of the different bodies of control.
The formal domestic control organs generally present the problem as something that
has to do with the Swedish authorities’ handling of the process of seeking asylum and
residence permits – a procedural issue. This framing of particular and rarely more
general problems is linked to an assumption that the underlying solution is that the
bureaucracy can and should be improved by means of better routines. However this
framing of the problem leaves many issues unproblematized. The framing by formal
international control organs either in the form of particular problems (as in the non-
refoulement frame) or as more general problems (as in the rule of law, positive
obligations and non-discrimination and the repressive elements frames) includes a
broad variation of problem representations. This form of framing represents both
problems inside the process of seeking residence permits, and problems that lie outside
of this process, for example the right to healthcare for undocumented individuals.
However, the criticism is formulated in terms of recommendations rather than con-
demnation. The informal control bodies’ (NGOs) framing of problems resembles that
employed by the UN but could perhaps to a greater extent be interpreted as constituting
criticism that challenges the Bsystem^. Thus, the analysis of the controls might also be
discussed in relation to whether the framing of the problem challenges the legitimacy of
the state. The potentiality for challenging the legitimacy of the state may well be
analysed from the perspective that the frames represented by the UN and NGOs include
more systemic criticism than those employed by the formal domestic controls and
European Court. Their framing of the problem may, to a greater extent than the
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framings employed by the other bodies of control, reflect what Mathiesen [34] has
labelled negative reforms, which both contradict and compete with the prevailing order.
The analysis of the positions and strategies of bodies controlling the state has shown
itself to be of value for understanding the ways in which bodies that exercise formal and
informal controls of state actions frame the problem of the Swedish state’s handling of
applications for residence permits. For all of the bodies of control (but to a greater for
the NGOs in their role as an informal body of control), the formulation of their criticism
of the state is based on issues of strategy and on considerations of what is necessary to
maintain their credibility. The struggle for recognition and legitimacy that takes place
within the field is also described as a balancing act. The formal role of the Parliamen-
tary Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice, the European Court and the UN Commit-
tees means that they risk, in Mathiesen’s terminology, being defined in and therefore
considered undangerous. The NGOs have to consider, to borrow from Mathiesen [34]
terminology, strategies that would move them into the established systems, or strategies
that will keep them outside the established system. From a position outside the system,
they may strengthen their chances of ensuring overall change, but at the same time risk
being defined out and becoming irrelevant.
The ways in which bodies controlling the state frame their criticism are conditioned
by a certain understanding of the social world. Challenging the doxa of the field may, as
observed by NGO representatives, compromise the organisation’s influence and cred-
ibility. Some of the NGOs interviewed acknowledge how they have to adapt to the rules
of the game, or risk being perceived as impossible and losing their influence. The
strategies involved include the ways in which they express their criticism or claims, for
example avoid certain expressions and adapt to the use of formal language. Due to the
logic of the field, the NGOs cannot question the rules of the game, or the doxa within
the field, and at the same time be accepted as players in the game. Since the start of the
so-called ‘migration crisis’, Swedish policies towards asylum seekers have been wors-
ened by the decision to tighten the country’s borders and the implementation of stricter
regulations for residency permits. The measures taken by the Swedish government in
2015 and 2016 may be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to discourage potential
asylum seekers from seeking asylum in Sweden. There is reason to believe that
positions within the field have shifted, with those who challenge doxa by questioning
border controls and a restrictive immigration policy, and by promoting the opening of
safe and legal routes for people in need, today being viewed as even less reasonable.
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